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I. Introduction
Focusing on New York City banks in the 1920s and
1930s, this study examines how banks manage their
asset risk and capital ratio during normal times and
in response to severe shocks. Recent models of bank-
ing under asymmetric information argue that bank
capital can be costly to raise and that depositors pe-
nalize banks that offer high-risk deposits. We develop
and apply a simple framework that identifies the trade-
offs among the alternative means of satisfying de-
positors’ preferences for low-risk deposits (i.e., low
asset risk versus high capital). That framework also
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We model the trade-off
between low-asset risk
and low leverage to sat-
isfy preferences for low-
risk deposits and apply it
to interwar New York
City banks. During the
1920s, profitable lending
and low costs of raising
capital produced in-
creased bank asset risk
and increased capital,
with no deposit risk
change. Differences in
the costs of raising equity
explain differences in as-
set risk and capital ratios.
In the 1930s, rising de-
posit default risk led to
deposit withdrawals. In
response, banks increased
riskless assets and cut
dividends. Banks with
high default risk or high
costs of raising equity
contracted dividends the
most.
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illustrates how bank “capital crunches” can arise—contractions in lending that
result from losses in bank capital.
In our empirical work, we examine how banks simultaneously targeted their
asset risk and capital ratios to achieve low deposit risk in the interwar period,
and how banks responded to large adverse shocks to their capital during the
Depression, which temporarily raised the default risk of their deposits.
We focus on the behavior of New York City banks during the interwar
period for two reasons. First, our choice of sample reflects a historical interest
in the role of bank credit during the Great Depression. Second, data on the
behavior of historical banks (banks that existed prior to regulatory standards
that now constrain capital and portfolio choices) are uniquely valuable for
testing theories of bank portfolio and capital choices under asymmetric in-
formation. The choice of New York reflects the importance of the city as a
banking center, as well as the availability of data for these banks.
We find that during the 1920s profitable lending opportunities and low costs
of raising capital prompted banks to accumulate capital and increase their
asset risk, while still maintaining low default risk on deposits. In response to
loan losses in the early 1930s and the high costs of raising new capital, banks
faced significant pressure from depositors to reduce deposit risk. Banks cut
dividends but avoided new offerings of stock and, thus, allowed capital to
remain low. The primary means to reduce depositor risk, and thus prevent
deposit withdrawals, was the contraction of the supply of loans. Banks replaced
loans into riskless assets. This was a gradual process that took place over
several years, owing to large adjustment costs of loan liquidation. Cross-
sectional differences in the adverse-selection cost of issuing new equity (which
we identify using secondary market bid-ask spreads) explain differences in
banks’ choices of asset risk and capital ratios.
These results provide evidence consistent with the view that the contraction
in bank credit during the Depression was largely a result of a “capital crunch”
that forced banks to limit their loan portfolio risk. Our results also provide
an explanation for the decline in bank capital and the increase in bank cash
reserves during the 1930s. Previous work has viewed capital and liquid assets
of banks in isolation and has produced opposing claims about changes in the
risk preferences of bankers during the interwar period. Friedman and Schwartz
(1963)—focusing on holdings of liquid assets—argue that banks became more
risk-averse in the 1930s, while Berger, Herring, and Szego (1995)—focusing
on book capital measures—reach the opposite conclusion. We find that bank
risk aversion (measured as the targeted level of deposit risk) did not change
from the 1920s to the 1930s; the difference between the 1920s and the 1930s
was the relative importance of capital and liquid assets as mechanisms for
insulating depositors from loan risk.
Our discussion divides into six sections. Section II reviews the theoretical
literature on bank portfolio and financing choice, and the literature’s rela-
tionship to the debate over the role of bank credit contraction during the Great
Depression. Section III develops a simple model that provides the basis for
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our empirical work. Section IV contains the empirical analysis of individual
New York City banks’ behavior from 1920 to 1940. Section V discusses our
contribution to the question of whether banks became more or less risk-averse
in the wake of the Great Depression. Section VI concludes.
II. Portfolio Risk and Financing Choices under Asymmetric
Information
What is the optimal risk structure of a bank’s portfolio? How is that portfolio
risk distributed between bank debt and capital—in other words, what is the
optimal leverage of a bank? Recent models in corporate finance—especially
those that analyze the financing problem of banks—argue that there is a
connection between these two questions. In particular, this new literature
implies that the “debt capacity” of a firm (the maximum economical amount
of debt it can issue) is a decreasing function of its asset risk.
The frameworks of Leland and Pyle (1977), Campbell and Kracaw (1980),
and Myers and Majluf (1984) derive the more general point that the riskier the
claims offered to outsiders, the more costly it will be to raise funds from
outsiders. Those models imply that it is always desirable (if possible) for in-
formed “insiders” to hold equity and for outsiders to hold low-risk debt. If firms
are driven to issue risky claims to outsiders, doing so is highly costly, since
outsiders have to be convinced of the quality of the firm’s assets. Indeed, the
difficulty of raising funds from outsiders in the form of junior claims explains
why underwriting costs for equity offerings are often very high, particularly
for “information-problematic” firms (Calomiris and Himmelberg 2001).
An implication of the asymmetric-information models of corporate finance
is that firms can reduce the “lemons cost” of raising funds by reducing (in an
observable way) the riskiness of their portfolios. If a firm shifts toward more
cash assets, its asset risk declines, and the lemons premium on its outside claims
also falls. Lower asset risk raises the firm’s capacity to issue low-risk debt.
In banking, there are special problems that tend to reinforce the incentives
to issue low-risk debt to outsiders, and thus banks face special incentives to
manipulate the composition of their assets (the ratio of cash to total assets)
in order to limit the riskiness of their debt. Models of banking under asym-
metric information tend to emphasize two special aspects of the banking firm:
the potential conflict of interest between bankers and depositors (first em-
phasized by Diamond [1984]) and banks’ role as issuers of transactable media.
Both of these problems faced by banks encourage them to offer extremely
short-term (typically demandable), low-risk debt. That is, banks efficiently
segment their risk, concentrating most risk in the equity and debt holdings of
insiders and thus insulating outsiders from bearing risk.
The agency argument for this risk segmentation begins by assuming that
because banks are information specialists that are given control over financial
assets, agency problems in banking are likely to be especially pronounced.
In Calomiris and Kahn (1991) or Calomiris, Kahn, and Krasa (1992), limiting
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depositors’ risks by offering them demandable debt helps to resolve agency
problems between the banker and the depositors either by limiting the bank’s
propensity to take on excessive risk or by preventing the bank from absconding
with depositors’ funds.
The role of banks as suppliers of transacting media is modeled by Gorton
and Pennacchi (1990). They stress that it is difficult for outsiders to value bank
portfolios and that this can make it hard to transact in bank claims. Low-risk
debt claims on the bank (deposits) will be more easily traded among uninformed
third parties because the unknown risk of the bank’s portfolio has little effect
on their value. Because depositors value the liquidity of their claims, banks will
find it advantageous to offer low-risk debt to finance themselves.
These models of banking under asymmetric information imply that banks
will face strong market pressure to offer low-risk debt to outsiders, both
because such debt protects depositors from inappropriate bank behavior, and
because it enhances the liquidity of bank claims. Banks that try to raise funds
from outsiders by offering riskier claims will suffer cost penalties (or, as in
Calomiris and Kahn [1991], may not be able to raise external funds at all).
These models also offer insights on how banks are likely to respond to
shocks. If a bank experiences loan losses (which reduce the bank’s capital in
market value terms and raise both the asset risk and leverage of the bank),
the riskiness of bank debt will consequently rise. For example, even if de-
positors cannot observe the precise characteristics of the bank’s portfolio, they
can observe economic downturns and make projections about the consequent
average loan losses experienced by banks. Depositors who were previously
content with the low riskiness of their claims will respond to the increased
risk of bank debt by penalizing their banks—either by demanding a penalty
interest rate (a rate that contains a “lemons premium”) or by withdrawing
their funds and placing them in other banks, in postal savings accounts (popular
during the interwar period), or under the proverbial mattress.
In this environment, banks face strong incentives to limit deposit risk. It
will be difficult for a bank to reduce its portfolio risk by selling risky assets—
after all, the function of the bank is to hold loans that are not readily marketable
(Froot and Stein 1998). The two practical means of reducing deposit risk are
(1) to liquidate loans as quickly as possible as they mature and replace them
with cash assets or (2) to accumulate new capital, either by retaining more
earnings or issuing new capital. None of these alternatives is costless, espe-
cially during a recession.
In a recession, attempts to liquidate loans as they mature may force bor-
rowers into financial distress and, thus, reduce the value of bank loans. Fur-
thermore, banks build valuable customer relationships over time through their
investments in information (for theory, see Rajan [1992] and Calomiris [1995];
for empirical evidence, see Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek [1993] and Petersen
and Rajan [1994]). Abandoning a loan customer means shedding an asset that
earns positive quasi rents for the bank (profits in excess of the risk-adjusted
return on marketable assets, which reward banks for ex ante investment in
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TABLE 1 Aggregate Balance Sheet Data of New York City Fed Member Banks
for Selected Dates (End-of-Year Data)
Year L C T L/(C T) A D
1922 3,663 1,778 2.06 7,689 6,374
1925 4,732 1,745 2.71 8,952 7,552
1929 6,683 2,004 3.33 13,583 10,173
1931 4,763 2,592 1.84 10,417 7,781
1933 3,453 3,405 1.01 9,496 7,284
1934 3,159 5,289 .60 11,372 9,512
1936 3,855 7,061 .55 13,734 11,824
1940 3,384 13,325 .25 19,688 17,744
Source.—Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1976, pp. 80–82).
Note.—Variable definitions: L p bank loans, C p cash assets (cash plus reserves), T p U. S. Treasury
securities, A p total assets (book value), and D p total deposits.
information). Thus, loan liquidation is costly, and the loan liquidation process
may be very protracted (we will argue below that during the Great Depression
the process took years to complete).
Accumulating additional bank capital is also expensive. Issuing new equity
in the middle of a recession is costly because the costs of adverse selection
(lemons premiums) are countercyclical. Potential purchasers of bank equity are
aware of a significant increase in downside risk within the banking system and
face high costs of distinguishing good from bad bank loan portfolios. Cutting
dividends provides only limited amounts of new capital to the bank (particularly
when earnings are low) and reduces stockholder liquidity at an inopportune
time (which can backfire on the bank by reducing the value of bank stock).
Thus, during recessions, banks seeking to avoid deposit outflows are caught
between the Scylla of loan disposal costs and the Charybdis of high adverse
selection costs of raising equity. This costly adjustment process—where banks
trade off the costs of losing deposits against the costs of losing loan value
and the costs of raising equity—is often referred to as a “bank capital crunch”
(Bernanke and Lown 1991).
Macroeconomists (including Fisher [1933] and Bernanke [1983]) emphasize
that bank capital crunches entail severe contractions in the supply of bank
credit and that these magnify recessionary contractions of economic activity.
There is a growing microeconometric literature tracing the effects of bank
capital losses on the supply of credit, and a related macroeconometric literature
examining the links between bank credit supply and the level of economic
activity (Baer and McElravey 1993; Kashyap and Stein 1995; Peek and Ro-
sengren 1997; Van den Heuvel 2002).
Macroeconomists (see Calomiris [1993] for a review) have emphasized the
potential importance of the bank capital crunch (and consequent bank credit-
supply contraction) during the Great Depression. As table 1 shows, the decline
in bank lending by New York City banks during the 1930s was impressive.
Furthermore, evidence that bank credit contraction was correlated with eco-
nomic contraction can be found in Bernanke (1983) and Ramos (1995). But
these papers do not convincingly identify a contraction in bank loan supply,
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induced by the capital crunch. Critics of the Fisher (1933) and Bernanke
(1983) view might argue that the correlation between bank credit and economic
activity reflects expectations of poor economic conditions that depress the
demand for loans. Thus, an important missing link in the existing literature
is the one that connects banking distress to the decline in bank lending. In
the discussion and evidence that follow, we argue that analysis of individual
banks can help to identify the sources of credit contraction.
In addition to contributing to the understanding of the Great Depression, an
examination of the behavior of New York City banks in the 1920s and 1930s
provides a useful and somewhat unique testing ground for theories of capital
crunches induced by asymmetric information problems in banking. Previous
empirical work on bank capital crunches has examined recent bank behavior,
but such behavior may be an artifact of capital regulation rather than an equi-
librium outcome chosen by banks in response to asymmetric-information prob-
lems. Currently, banks’ capital ratios are regulated as part of the government’s
safety net and accompanying prudential regulation. Those regulations—
particularly, the Basel capital standards and their incarnation in the United
States through the Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement
Act (1989) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(1991) statutes—have created a regulatory link between capital ratios and
portfolio risk (Baer and McElravey 1993; Van den Heuvel 2002). Insured
banks may face strong incentives to raise their leverage and expand their
lending without concern over depositor discipline (since depositors are now
insured by the government). To the extent that banks operate on a “regulatory
margin” (rather than setting capital and portfolio risk to satisfy their uninsured
providers of funds), capital crunches may simply indicate that regulators are
enforcing risk-based capital standards—which are designed to force banks to
link their capital ratios and loan ratios.
An examination of the 1920s and 1930s affords a unique opportunity to
test theories of bank portfolio and capital structure under asymmetric infor-
mation in an environment where capital and portfolio risk are not constrained
by regulatory capital standards. New York City banks during the 1920s and
1930s are an ideal sample for our purposes. Because these banks were large,
publicly traded institutions, their balance sheet data and stock prices (which
we use to infer market values of capital, bank asset risk, and deposit default
risk) are readily available throughout the interwar period. Furthermore, the
risk choices of publicly traded New York City banks probably were not sig-
nificantly influenced by the passage of deposit insurance in 1933. New York
City banks’ deposits were typically too large to be covered by deposit in-
surance in the 1930s (Saunders and Wilson 1995).
III. Theoretical Framework
We develop and apply a simple model, which combines Black and Scholes
(1973) contingent-claims pricing of deposits with information asymmetry be-
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tween bankers and outside funding sources, and which identifies the trade-
offs among the alternative means of satisfying the depositor low-default-risk
constraint. The equilibrium choice of capital and portfolio structure reflects
the opposing influences of the cost of raising bank capital from outsiders and
the quasi rents from lending that are forgone when banks contract portfolio
risk.
The dynamic macroeconomic process giving rise to capital shocks, and
banks’ costs of adjustment to reach long-run equilibrium, are not modeled
here explicitly. The comparative statics of the long-run model of bank capital
and asset risk choice, however, provide insight about the nature of long-run
adjustment to recessionary shocks. Adverse economic shocks will reduce bank
capital, raise the adverse-selection costs of issuing equity, and reduce quasi
rents from lending. The model predicts that such exogenous changes will
produce no long-run change in the riskiness of deposits but will result in
persistent reductions in capital and in substitution into riskless assets and away
from loans. The costs to the bank of liquidating loans (quasi rents forgone
and counterproductive financial distress of clients) may make the reduction
of deposit risk and asset risk a gradual and protracted process.
The scale of the bank (A) is assumed to be predetermined. Assume that a
bank can hold two kinds of assets, risky loans (L) and riskless “reserves” (R):
Ap L R. (1)
Asset risk is defined as the standard deviation of asset returns (sA). From
equation (1) we know that:
s p (L/A)s , (2)A L
where sL is the exogenously given riskiness of loans (the standard deviation
of the returns to the loan portfolio). For convenience, we adopt the other basic
assumptions of Black and Scholes (1973) regarding the evolution of asset
returns over time and the normality of sA, although we consider variations in
the Black and Scholes model that incorporate extended liability of share-
holders, where appropriate. The role of the Black and Scholes model in our
framework and empirical work is to provide a concrete shape to the isorisk
map for deposits—a set of lines shown in figure 1—not to test alternative
frameworks for pricing deposit risk, of which the Black and Scholes model
is one. Given the exogeneity of loan portfolio risk, the choice variable of the
bank for setting asset risk is (L/A).
Banks earn quasi rents from lending (as in Rajan [1992]). That is, banks
possess private information and, hence, valuable client relationships that make
the risk-adjusted profits from lending positive. Thus, banks are not indifferent
to the relative size of their loan and riskless asset portfolios; in our model,
if external finance were not costly because of asymmetric information, banks
would choose to hold all their assets in loans (because we abstract from
physical transaction demand for reserves unrelated to the risk of bank assets).
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Fig. 1.—Depositor indifference curves
We assume for simplicity that total quasi rents (r) are a fixed proportion (a)
of loans made by the bank. Our results would be qualitatively unchanged if,
more realistically, we specified a as a declining function of L:
rp aL. (3)
Equations (2) and (3) imply:
rp aAs /s . (4)A L
We assume (for simplicity) that bankers raise all equity externally and face
adverse-selection costs when issuing equity. According to Calomiris and Raff
(1995), during the 1920s and 1930s, fees paid by stock issuers to underwriters
typically exceeded 10% of the value of the equity being sold. Additionally,
the negative signaling effect of a stock issue may impose underpricing costs
on existing shareholders, who sell new shares at a depressed price.
The deadweight cost (C) borne by insiders for issuing equity is assumed
to be proportional to the amount offered (see Altmkilic and Hansen [1997]
and Calomiris and Himmelberg [2001] for supporting evidence), and the risk-
iness of assets (sA) magnifies adverse-selection cost. That is:
Cp b(s )E, (5)A
where E is the amount of equity issued by the bank. Thus, the market capital-
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to-asset ratio of the bank is E/A. For simplicity, we assume that the b function
is linear in sA.
The riskiness of bank debt is measured using Black and Scholes (1973).
Bank deposits are assumed to have a 1-year maturity—a convenient way of
allowing deposits to be at risk of default without sacrificing the continuity
assumptions of Black and Scholes. If one assumed a 1-day maturity, given
the continuous price movements of Black and Scholes, deposits would always
be virtually riskless. Of course, asset prices do not always move continuously,
and effective deposit maturity depends on the frequency with which depositors
decide on whether to withdraw their funds (which is why default risk is
significant even for zero-maturity bank debt). Although we recognize that the
specific assumptions we adopt regarding debt maturity and asset returns con-
tinuity may give rise to estimated default premiums that are inaccurate in the
cardinal sense, our emphasis is on variation in default premiums over time
and across banks, and our method seems likely to create reasonable orderings
of bank default risk. We also recognize that the Black and Scholes (1973)
model assumes costless information and is thus not strictly consistent with
our other assumptions of bank quasi rents and adverse-selection costs. But
again, we emphasize that our primary empirical goal in using Black and
Scholes is to measure differences in deposit risk over time and across banks,
rather than to price deposit risk in an absolute sense.
The Black and Scholes (1973) model solves simultaneously for three var-
iables: (1) the riskiness of bank deposits (P)—defined as the credit risk spread
(basis points of annual return) that would fairly compensate depositors for
the default risk on deposits—as a function of the maturity of debt (assumed
here to equal one), (2) the capital ratio of the bank in market value terms (E/
A), and (3) the riskiness of bank assets (sA). The specific functional form is
illustrated in figures l and 2. For our purposes, it is sufficient to point out
here that a general form of the equation is:
Pp f (s , E/A), where f 1 0 and f ! 0. (6)A 1 2
To close the model, we assume that banks target specific levels of P in the
long run. One can interpret this long-run target as the result of a combination
of stockholder preferences and depositor preferences for low default risk.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) show that adverse-selection costs reflecting
asymmetric information about bank assets will encourage banks to concentrate
risk in equity offerings as a means of creating a set of liquid claims (deposits)
that can be transacted without significant adverse-selection costs. Calomiris
and Kahn (1991) provide a different model of depositor preference for low-
risk deposits, which emphasizes the advantages of giving depositors the option
to withdraw their funds on demand.
Alternatively, Winton (1993) and Kane and Wilson (1998) argue that the
composition of stockholders and changes in extended liability rules could
affect, and did affect, banks stockholders’ tolerance for risk on their claims.
From the perspective of that argument, the effect of extended liability de-
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Fig. 2.—Long-run comparative statics with BP (basis point)pp 1
pended crucially on the composition of stockholders. If stockholders were
informed and wealthy insiders with low risk aversion, extended liability could
increase bank managers’ chosen level of default risk. By contrast, if stock-
holders were less wealthy risk-averse outsiders, stockholder risk aversion
might limit bank asset risk and deposit default risk by more than the amount
necessary to satisfy depositors’ preferences. In our empirical work we will
consider whether depositor or stockholder preferences were binding con-
straints on the long-run choice of P during our sample period.
Formally, in our model, we assume that a penalty would be paid by the
bank (an increased difficulty of attracting depositors or bank stockholders) if
it tried to raise the value of P above a given low level (PM). For simplicity,
we assume that the penalty is zero for risk levels below PM and prohibitively
large for raising default risk above PM, and thus we effectively assume that
banks will always target a long-run equilibrium combination of E/A and L/A
that offers depositors deposits with risk equal to PM. Any strictly convex
penalty function would achieve a similar result, namely, resulting in an upper
bound on targeted deposit default risk. The assumed nonlinearity of the penalty
is consistent with several theoretical interpretations. For example, in the con-
text of the Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) model, a bank’s failure to keep its
deposit risk sufficiently low may result in its being excluded from the payments
system (e.g., being ejected from the clearinghouse). Alternatively, in the con-
text of the Calomiris and Kahn (1991) model, banks offering high-risk debt
may simply be unable to attract depositors at any price. In our empirical work,
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we will allow each bank’s choice of P to vary across banks and over time
depending on bank characteristics related to stockholder preferences.
The banker’s objective is to maximize profit, which equals the difference
between quasi rents earned from lending and the physical costs of placing
equity. In other words, we assume that the outside depositors and stockholders
of the bank receive a fair expected compensation (commensurate with the
true asset risk of the bank) and, thus, that the banker merely retains the rents
from lending net of the costs of issuing equity. One way to enforce this
arrangement would be to tie the banker’s compensation to the bank’s
performance.
Assuming that the banker maximizes profits (J), he maximizes the value
of the following expression, choosing E/A and sA (which is the same as
choosing E/A and L/A), subject to the constraint of equation (6) and the
constraint that :Pp PM
Jp (as A/s ) bs E. (7)A L A
Assuming that , this expression can be rewritten as equation (8), usingPp PM
equation (6) to express E/A as a function g(sA):
J/Ap as /s  bs g(s ). (8)A L A A
Recall that A is predetermined. Differentiating with respect to sA, the first-
order condition for profit maximization is given by:
′a/bs p g(s ) s g (s ), (9)L A A A
where g is the first derivative of g.
The solution to equation (9) can be illustrated diagramatically. Figure 1 de-
scribes deposit isorisk curves for a one-basis point deposit risk premium and a
50-basis point risk premium, drawn in the space defined by sA and E/A. Figure
2 graphs the two sides of equation (9), assuming that basis point. InPp one
figure 2, we define . The equilibrium value of sA is de-′Qp g(s ) s g (s )A A A
termined by the intersection of Q and a/bsL. For example, whether the bank
chooses to locate at point X or point Z depends on sL and the relative sizes
of a and b. The larger is a (or the smaller is b), the more the banker will
prefer to satisfy depositor risk preferences by choosing a combination of higher
E/A and higher sA. The functional form of the Black and Scholes (1973) model
(which determines g, and hence the shape of Q) guarantees an interior solution
for profit maximization (because Q cuts a/bsL from below). Stated differently,
the second-order conditions for profit maximization are satisfied because the
Black and Scholes model implies that .′ ′′2g 1 g sA
The comparative statics illustrated in figure 2 are intuitive. When quasi
rents from lending are high (for a given cost of issuing capital), bankers prefer
to lend more and issue more capital to insulate depositors from the asset risk
implied by greater lending. Higher equity issuing costs (for any given set of
432 Journal of Business
Fig. 3.—Impact of capital shock
lending opportunities) lead bankers to prefer lower equity (hence, they are
constrained by depositor preferences to lend less).
Figures 2 and 3 show why it can be difficult to determine whether cross-
sectional differences, or differences over time, in banks’ chosen combinations
of capital and asset risk reflect differences in the marginal cost of raising
capital (parameter a) or differences in bank lending opportunities (parameter
b). In figure 2, it is not possible to say whether a bank located at point Z has
a high b or a low value of a compared with a bank located at point X.
Figure 3 illustrates how reactions to exogenous shocks that reduce capital
are similarly hard to trace to changes in a or b. Figure 3 plots points X and
Z from figure 2 in the space defined by E/A and sA. Suppose that point X in
figure 3 represents a bank’s position in 1928, and point Z represents that same
bank’s position in 1936. According to the Fisher (1933) and Bernanke (1983)
view of the contraction of credit during the Great Depression, the long-run
movement from point X to point Z over the 1930s reflects a combination of
exogenous capital loss and a high cost of replacing capital. Alternatively,
however, one could argue that the Depression reduced the bank’s profitability
from lending. A decline in quasi rents from lending can provide an alternative
explanation for the movement from X to Z.
The goals of our empirical work are, first, to show that the framework
described here and illustrated in figures 1–3 provides a realistic depiction of
Bank Capital and Portfolio Management 433
bank behavior, and, second, to distinguish between “loan-supply” and “loan-
demand” explanations for the contraction in banks’ targeted capital and asset
risk, which occurred during the 1930s.
IV. Empirical Analysis
Historical Background
The period from 1920 to 1940 witnessed three severe U.S. business cycle
contractions: the recession of 1920–21, the Great Depression of 1929–33, and
the recession of 1937–38 (for details, see Balke and Gordon [1989] and Romer
[1989]). A brief, mild recession also occurred in the second and third quarters
of 1924.
In comparison to the other downturns, the Depression was unusually severe
in magnitude and duration. The 1920–21 contraction in industrial production
(the seasonally adjusted series published by the Federal Reserve Board [Fed])
began in March 1920 and reached bottom in April 1921, and the recovery
was complete by November 1922. In the 1924 downturn, industrial production
recovered its January 1924 peak level in December 1924, personal income
(reported in Barger [1942]) recovered fully by the fourth quarter of 1924, and
factory employment (reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) recovered
by November 1925. The contraction in industrial production that began in
September 1929, in contrast, did not reach bottom until March 1933, and the
recovery in industrial production was not complete until December 1936. The
departure from gold in March 1933, however, was associated with rapid eco-
nomic recovery, measured by the rate of growth of the economy. Although
unemployment remained high throughout the 1930s and the level of gross
domestic product remained below trend until World War II, 1934–36 was one
of the periods of fastest economic growth in U.S. history. A brief recession
in 1937–38 was followed by another period of rapid growth as the United
States became an engine of wartime production, first for its allies, and later
for itself.
The history of U.S. interwar business cycles is reflected in the balance
sheet aggregates of New York City banks in ways that are consistent with
our previous theoretical discussion. As shown in table 1 (which reports data
for all New York City Fed member banks), the time of aggressive economic
expansion, from 1922 to 1929, was associated with rapid loan growth and
reductions in the ratio of liquid assets (cash plus Treasury securities) relative
to loans and discounts. Banks saw large quasi rents from lending during the
boom and were willing to undertake massive issues of new equity to support
their increased portfolio risk (to offset the effects on deposit default risk from
the rise in asset risk).
Tables 2 and 3 report market-based data for publicly traded banks in New
York City (the data appendix describes variable definitions and sources). As
shown in table 3 (which reports data for a sample of banks that remained in
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(%) P St.Dev. P MVA
No. of
Banks
1920 1.10 14.05 2.29 2.97 .49 2.5 227 27
1921 1.25 15.63 2.23 2.58 .13 .7 229 28
1922 1.31 14.86 3.85 3.25 40.27 240.1 188 44
1923 1.28 15.00 1.75 2.94 .19 1.2 193 39
1924 1.56 16.60 2.61 2.85 .00 .0 245 41
1925 1.89 18.59 4.76 3.07 3.44 14.3 212 55
1926 1.90 19.11 2.83 2.77 .01 .0 234 46
1927 2.27 24.98 5.80 3.21 .23 1.0 225 51
1928 2.81 27.73 7.46 3.46 .13 .5 382 44
1929 2.04 27.02 13.48 4.55 30.33 76.0 420 43
1930 1.39 20.74 6.92 6.26 15.24 69.9 369 42
1931 .81 14.89 7.13 8.86 127.60 364.5 380 29
1932 1.10 16.80 9.17 6.28 26.23 37.1 498 21
1933 .73 12.08 5.10 7.25 46.86 136.0 413 23
1934 .91 11.67 2.96 5.62 6.70 30.6 523 21
1935 1.23 14.26 5.04 4.71 12.78 55.8 609 22
1936 1.18 13.92 3.20 3.86 .72 3.3 653 22
1937 .84 10.82 2.84 4.75 .35 .8 580 22
1938 .80 9.94 3.08 6.20 7.23 21.3 591 23
1939 1.03 10.98 3.71 6.36 .29 1.2 686 24
1940 .74 7.87 2.17 8.56 10.73 55.0 576 32
Note.—The “unstable sample” is defined as the sample of banks that varies over time because of entry
and exit. The sample of banks is restricted to banks with available stock prices, as described in the data
appendix. Data are measured at year end. Variable definitions: MVE is the average market value of equity,
BVE is the average book value of equity, E/A is the average market capital-to-asset ratio, sA is the average
asset volatility (standard deviation of asset returns), BID-ASK is the average bid-ask spread as a percentage
of share price, P is the average deposit default premium in basis points (1.00 p 1 basis point), St. Dev. P is
the standard deviation of P, and MVA is the average market value of bank assets ($millions).
the sample throughout the years 1920–40) and table 2 (which reports sample
data allowing exit and entry of banks), the growth in bank lending during the
1920s was associated with significant increases in the market value of bank
stock (MV/BV), and in the ratio of capital to assets (E/A). The boom of the
1920s also led to increases in bank asset risk, which peaked in 1929. Our
measures of bank asset risk (sA) and deposit default premiums (P) are derived
from observed stock price variation (using weekly stock prices over the last
half of each year) and end-of-year bank balance sheet statistics, using the
Black and Scholes (1973) formula after 1933 and a variant of the Black and
Scholes formula that incorporates the effects of double liability for bank stock
valuation, which was relevant prior to 1933. A full treatment of the effects
of double liability on the choices of asset risk and capital is relegated to the
discussion of our regression analysis.
Recessions (1920–21, 1924, 1929–33, and 1937–38) are associated with
declines in lending activity, increases in the ratio of riskless assets (cash plus
government securities) to total assets, declines in bank capital, and increases
in the default premium on deposits. Relative to other recessions, the Great
Depression saw extreme declines in loan ratios and capital ratios. The reces-
sions of 1920–21 and 1937–38 caused a small increase in deposit default risk,
which banks were able to eliminate within 1 year. In 1929–30, bank behavior
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(%) P St.Dev. P MVA
1920 1.23 16.73 2.33 2.53 .00 .0 306
1921 1.40 18.03 2.78 2.41 .30 1.0 317
1922 1.51 18.40 4.27 2.09 7.75 26.5 363
1923 1.54 20.25 1.85 1.73 .00 .0 352
1924 1.89 21.70 3.72 1.78 .00 .0 434
1925 2.36 24.77 5.49 1.47 .07 .2 482
1926 2.27 26.10 2.88 1.26 .00 .0 530
1927 2.81 32.16 5.89 1.47 .00 .0 573
1928 3.82 34.16 8.28 2.58 .08 .2 858
1929 2.80 33.10 17.45 2.74 33.46 71.3 1,045
1930 2.06 26.86 8.32 2.05 1.24 2.8 998
1931 1.02 18.54 8.03 4.18 9.18 10.4 739
1932 1.16 19.24 10.62 5.64 34.73 46.8 712
1933 .88 15.02 6.10 5.41 41.69 112.5 641
1934 .98 13.88 3.75 5.48 11.72 40.5 781
1935 1.34 16.96 6.32 4.41 23.09 75.4 907
1936 1.32 16.74 4.31 3.66 1.32 4.5 976
1937 .94 12.95 3.74 4.28 .60 1.0 863
1938 .91 12.05 3.49 5.49 7.08 19.5 923
1939 1.39 14.70 5.55 5.63 .50 1.6 1,133
1940 .93 9.55 2.01 6.71 2.14 7.4 1,260
Note.—The “stable sample” is defined as the sample of banks that are present in the database throughout
the period. The sample of banks is restricted to banks with available stock prices, as described in the data
appendix. Data are measured at year end. Variable definitions: MVE is the average market value of equity,
BVE is the average book value of equity, E/A is the average market capital-to-asset ratio, sA is the average
asset volatility (standard deviation of asset returns), BID-ASK is the average bid-ask spread as a percentage
of share price, P is the average deposit default premium in basis points (1.00 is 1 basis point), St. Dev. P is
the standard deviation of P, and MVA is the average market value of bank assets ($millions).
was similar, but subsequent shocks in 1931, 1932, and 1933 posed an un-
precedented challenge to banks, and they were unable to reduce their default
risk quickly during those years.
The Depression was also unusual in another respect. In other recessions,
deposit outflows were relatively minimal, while during the Depression deposit
outflows were large. From June 1930 to June 1932, New York City banks’
deposits fell more than 30%. A possible explanation for the unusual decline
in deposits over this period is the reaction of risk-intolerant depositors to the
severity of bank capital loss and the slow adjustment back to low risk on
deposits.
Clearly, the primary means banks employed for controlling their asset risk
was the ratio of risky assets to riskless assets, and this variable declined steadily
throughout the 1930s. As shown in table 1, the ratio of the (book) value of
loans to the sum of cash, reserves, and government securities rose from 2.06
in 1922 to 3.33 in 1929, then declined to 1.84 in 1931, and continued to
decline, eventually reaching 0.25 in 1940.
Despite bankers’ willingness to substitute away from loans into cash, the
combination of high adjustment costs to liquidating loans, and the series of
closely timed adverse shocks that buffeted banks in the early 1930s, left banks
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no alternative but to allow deposit risk to rise from its historical levels (the
movement from point X to point Y shown in fig. 3). Our measure of depositor
risk on average for all banks (table 2) rises to a peak of 127.6 basis points
in 1931; the average peak for the stable sample of banks reaches its apex of
41.7 basis points in 1933. (The difference between the two samples in tables
2 and 3 reflects the fact that several risky banks exited our sample in the early
1930s.)
The immediate post-Depression years (1934–36) correspond to the adjust-
ment process back to long-run equilibrium with respect to deposit risk (a
movement from point Y to point Z in fig. 3). By the end of 1935, long-run
equilibrium had been essentially restored. Deposit risk rose once again briefly
during the recession of 1937–38, and again in 1940 because of a decline in
bank equity prices, which may have been related to wartime concerns.
Banks did not replace the capital that was lost during the Depression, and
capital ratios fell sharply from their peak in 1928–29. Many banks had issued
new stock in the 1920s. Several banks issued equity several times during the
1920s. For our sample of banks, we recorded 95 stock offerings from 1920
to 1930 (see table 6), but virtually no new stock was issued after 1930 (as
shown in table 6, we identified only four stock offerings for our sample of
banks from 1931 to 1940, two of which happened in 1937—in the aftermath
of 4 years of economic recovery). The decline in bank propensity to issue
stock is consistent with the view that, in the aftermath of the Depression, as
the potential for hidden loan losses loomed large, the adverse-selection cost
of new stock issues was prohibitive, and thus banks sought to satisfy the
depositor risk constraint through continuing reductions in portfolio risk rather
than offerings of new equity.
Banks cut dividends dramatically after 1929 (see table 9). Clearly, banks
were eager to amass capital but were not willing to pay the costs of accessing
equity markets in the 1930s to do so. Of the 21 banks in our 1939 sample,
18 cut (nominal cash) dividends from their 1929 levels, one kept dividends
unchanged, and two raised dividends.
Secondary market bid-ask spreads for bank stock provide another window
on the adverse-selection costs banks would have faced to raise equity exter-
nally. Tables 2 and 3 report data on average bid-ask spreads (as a percentage
of share price) for bank stocks. Bid-ask spreads reflect several influences, but
an important component of secondary market bid-ask spreads is the adverse-
selection premium charged by market makers to compensate for hidden in-
formation about the value of equity. Consistent with our argument that banks
suffered much larger adverse-selection problems in equity markets during the
1930s than they had previously—resulting from increases in the potential for
hidden asset quality problems in banks—tables 2 and 3 show that bid-ask
spreads for bank stocks in secondary markets widened significantly from 1929
to 1933 and remained large during the 1930s. That evidence is consistent with
the view that adverse-selection costs limited banks’ abilities to offer stock in
the 1930s.
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Another interpretation of the annual averages of the percentage bid-ask
spread is that risk (not adverse-selection costs) was pushing up bid-ask spreads
over time. To distinguish between these views, we examine the usefulness of
bid-ask spreads as measures of adverse-selection costs further in our panel
data analysis below.
In summary, the evidence on the average bank changes over time is con-
sistent with the theoretical predictions we outlined in Sections II and III. Six
facts about the changes in bank behavior over time warrant emphasis:
1. Banks target a low long-run equilibrium default risk on their deposits.
2. Low deposit default risk is maintained by a combination of sufficient
capital and limited asset risk. In the 1920s, low default risk was main-
tained despite higher asset risk because banks increased their capital.
In the 1930s, low default risk was achieved by lowering asset risk to
offset the effect of shrinking capital.
3. The Great Depression was associated with very large consecutive
shocks to capital, which were not offset immediately by reduced asset
risk (owing to adjustment costs associated with large, sudden liqui-
dations of bank loans). Thus, there is prima facie evidence that banks
may have been facing unprecedented finance constraints limiting their
ability to lend (the Fisher [1933] and Bernanke [1983] hypothesis).
Stated differently, the fact that the path from point X to point Z in
figure 3 was via point Y (and not merely along the low-default premium
isorisk line) is an indication that the supply of loanable funds was a
binding constraint on lending during the Depression. Otherwise (ac-
cording to our model), if banks had been able to raise capital at low
cost, they would not have permitted their default premiums to rise
above their low long-run equilibrium value.
4. Consistent with the assumption that some depositors are risk-intolerant
(and thus that allowing default premiums to rise temporarily is costly
to banks), the high deposit default risk during the early 1930s was
associated with contractions in bank deposits, which were reversed as
default risk declined. The long-run equilibrium in default risk and
deposit flows appears to have been reestablished by 1936.
5. The shift from a reliance on capital to a reliance on low asset risk as
a means to limit default risk on deposits reflected the fact that banks
were unwilling to issue new stock in the 1930s. The low incidence of
new stock issues during the 1930s was associated with higher bid-ask
spreads on bank stock in secondary markets, which may serve as a
proxy for the adverse-selection costs of issuing equity.
6. Banks cut dividends substantially during the 1930s to preserve inter-
nally generated (i.e., cheap) capital in order to restore default risk to
its low long-run value.
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Panel Regressions
We turn now to microeconometric evidence using panel regressions. Our
description of banking trends in the 1920s and 1930s focused on variation
across time. Here we concentrate on cross-sectional variation, using firm-level
data and controlling for time effects.
We find more direct confirmation for the assumptions of the model and the
Fisher (1933) and Bernanke (1983) view that banks were finance constrained
in the 1930s. The contraction in bank lending seems to be largely attributable
to a contraction in the supply of loans. Bank capital losses created strong
incentives for banks to curtail their deposit default risk. Reductions in bank
lending were the least-cost response, given the desirability of avoiding both
depositor “discipline” and the adverse-selection costs of raising new equity.
The rise in deposit risk after 1928 had clear costs for banks in the form of
lost deposits. Risky banks that were unable to cut lending and dividends
sufficiently to limit the risk of default on their deposits suffered observable
costs from not doing so (i.e., lost deposits).
Banks with high adverse-selection costs tended to choose low-capital, low-
asset risk strategies compared with banks with low adverse-selection costs.
That evidence lends credence to the view that increases in adverse-selection
costs placed binding constraints on banks.
Banks moved aggressively to cut dividends despite the value of dividends
for liquidity-constrained stockholders. Banks with high deposit risk and high
adverse-selection cost tended to cut dividends more than other banks.
Our discussion divides into four parts. First, we test the central assumption
of our model—that banks target low default risk on deposits in the long run—
by investigating whether the banks that chose higher asset risk also tended
to choose higher capital ratios. Second, we test the hypothesized link between
increased depositor risk and deposit outflows. Did banks that allowed their
default premiums to rise to relatively high levels also experience relatively
large “penalties” in the form of deposit outflows? Third, we test for effects
of a financing constraint on bank lending by investigating whether adverse-
selection costs explain the differences across banks in their propensity to
finance through equity. Finally, we examine cross-sectional variation in
changes in dividends to investigate the extent to which banks cut dividends
in the 1930s in response to the rising costs of funding themselves through
outsiders.
Limited versus Extended Liability
Thus far, our discussion has focused on the role depositors play in disciplining
bank behavior by encouraging banks to target a combination of asset risk and
capital ratio that limits the default risk on deposits. But it is also important
to consider how stockholders’ incentives may have affected the level of long-
run default risk targeted by banks, particularly given the important changes
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that occurred during our sample period in the ownership of bank stock and
the rules governing the extended liability of back stockholders.
Prior to 1933, double liability was the rule for national and state-chartered
New York banks. In 1933, banks were permitted to abolish double liability
protection at any time after giving 6 months’ notice to depositors. Double
liability was soon abolished and replaced by strictly limited liability for state
and national banks (see Wilson and Kane 1997; and Kane and Wilson 1998).
As Kane and Wilson (1998) show, the timing of the shift away from double
liability effectively may have begun much sooner. The number of bank stock-
holders rose sharply in 1929 (partly because of provisions of the McFadden
Act of 1927). The value of double-liability protection depends crucially on
stockholders’ wealth, as shown by Winton (1993). Kane and Wilson (1998)
argue that, as stock became widely held after 1929, wealthy insiders held
increasingly smaller proportions of bank stock; thus, de facto, double liability
protection may have been reduced.
Kane and Wilson’s (1998) findings about, and discussion of, double liability
suggest that, in addition to depositor discipline, the composition of stock-
holders and the rules governing their liability for bank losses may have affected
banks’ chosen levels of deposit risk. We take account of this possibility in
our regression analysis below by including variables that capture the potential
effects of changes in double liability rules and bank ownership concentration.
Specifically, we allow the bank’s choice of capital and asset risk to depend
on the ratio of capital subject to extended liability relative to the total market
value of capital (i.e., the par value of bank stock relative to the market value
of bank assets). If the presence of double liability permitted greater risk taking,
then a dollar of capital subject to double liability should have been associated
with more asset risk than a dollar of capital not subject to double liability.
Conversely, if stockholder risk aversion constrained bank risk, the effect of
high par capital on asset risk would be negative.
We also allow the concentration of ownership (measured by the ratio of
the number of shares outstanding—which Kane and Wilson [1998] show is
a good proxy for the number of stockholders—relative to the total market
value of bank assets) to affect the chosen level of deposit risk. Ownership
concentration could matter for two opposing reasons. First, to the extent that
lower ownership concentration reduced the effective capital of bank stock-
holders available to be seized (which we call the “poor stockholder effect”),
lower ownership concentration would be associated with lower asset risk per
unit of capital. By contrast, to the extent that lower ownership concentration
enhanced stockholder diversification (what we call the “diversification effect”),
lower ownership concentration might have increased the tolerance on the part
of stockholders for higher asset risk.
The coefficients on both the par capital-to-market asset value ratio and
stockholder concentration are permitted to vary across three subperiods
(1920–28, 1929–33, and 1934–40), which allows for differences in the sign
and importance of these effects over time. The influence of double liability
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and ownership concentration on our estimates of deposit default risk and asset
risk could vary over time. For example, the ownership concentration effect
may have been more different in sign and importance across periods because
of changes in the relative importance of the diversification effect and the poor
stockholder effect, which could vary over the business cycle. Double liability
should also matter differently over time, even after controlling for changes
in ownership concentration. Double liability was only in effect prior to 1934,
but it might have been most relevant during the period 1929–33, when bank
capital was sufficiently low that the put option inherent in double liability
had the greatest value for depositors.
Modeling Asset Risk and Bank Capital
We are now prepared to consider more directly the role of market discipline
on bank choices of capital and asset risk. If, as we have argued, banks try to
maintain low default risk on deposits, then asset risk and capital ratios are
not determined independently. For example, bank portfolio risk should in-
crease endogenously in response to exogenous increases in bank capital. Sim-
ilarly, when capital falls exogenously, banks should reduce their asset risk
exposures (or increase their capital) to limit the increases in their deposit
default risk. Our model not only implies that risk and capital are positively
related, it also has testable implications for the shape of that relationship. As
figure 3 shows, the function relating capital ratios and asset risk should have
no intercept and should be nonlinear. Differences in depositor default risk
tolerance imply the choice of a higher deposit isorisk line (e.g., 50 basis points
instead of one basis point). Thus, higher risk tolerance should be reflected in
a flatter slope relating the capital ratio to asset risk. Table 4 provides some
simple tests of these propositions using data from individual banks.
The regressions reported in table 4 relate changes in bank asset risk to
changes in the ratio of the market value of capital to the market value of
assets. Our sample includes all available banks (not just the stable sample)
for the years 1921–40. We report results for two-stage least squares (2SLS)
regressions where possible, which use predicted rather than actual changes in
capital as independent variables, to control for endogenous contemporaneous
changes in capital. The 2SLS estimates use lagged bank-specific variables and
bank type and year indicator variables as instruments. Bank-specific instru-
ments include the bank’s lagged capital ratio and lagged asset volatility. Bank
type indicator variables identify whether banks are state trusts, state banks,
or national banks. We also include lagged industrial production growth as an
instrument.
We report several alternative specifications. Our specifications include, in
addition to the capital ratio and the square of the capital ratio, lags of the
capital ratio and asset volatility (included to allow for the gradual adjustment
of asset risk to capital changes), and a variety of other variables included to
capture potential depositor or stockholder preferences that may have influenced
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the desired level of default risk on deposits, which we allow to interact with
bank capital in the regressions. (Recall that, according to fig. 3, any variables
that affect bank default risk preferences should enter as interaction effects
with capital, since the intercept is always zero irrespective of the choice of
default risk.)
We included charter type to capture potential differences in depositor pref-
erences related to deposit composition (which may have differed across charter
types). Charter-type indicator variables show whether the bank is a trust com-
pany or whether it is a national bank, as opposed to a state-chartered nontrust
bank. We included a business-cycle indicator (the log difference of industrial
production), or, alternatively, year indicator variables, to control for time var-
iation in default risk, given that banks were not always on their long-run
default risk schedule. We also included variables that capture differences in
ownership concentration and the relative importance of extended liability (i.e.,
the book-to-market ratio). Finally, we allow the coefficient on the capital ratio
to depend on bank size (measured by the inverse of the market value of total
bank assets). Bank size should affect the ability of a bank to diversify its loan
portfolio and thus limit asset risk.
The regressions uniformly show a large and statistically significant positive
relationship between capital and asset risk. The effect of the square of the
capital ratio is never significant. When one takes account of cross-sectional
and cross-time differences in targeted default risk (in specifications 3 and 4
of table 4), the intercept term is insignificantly different from zero, as predicted
by the model.
The bank charter type indicator variables are generally not statistically
significant and diminish in magnitude when time effects are included, indi-
cating little difference in risk targeting as the result of charter choice. Lagged
volatility enters positively and significantly, supporting the view that adjust-
ment to shocks was gradual. Ordinary least squares (OLS) rather than 2SLS
results are reported for the final two specifications, since all the variables used
as instruments in the other specifications are captured by the regressors in
specifications 3 and 4 of table 4.
The high default risk on deposits shown in tables 2 and 3 in the wake of
recessions is apparent in the more positive coefficients on interactive capital
ratio-year effects in recession or postrecession years (1922, 1925, 1929–33,
and 1939). That is, for any given capital ratio, the slope relating capital to
asset risk was steeper during the Depression years than in other years because
default risk was higher in those years (as implied by fig. 3). Similarly, in
table 4, specification 3, where the growth in industrial production takes the
place of the year dummies, the interaction effect is negative, indicating that
in the years following low growth in industrial production, banks were tem-
porarily pushed off their long-run default risk choice and accepted higher
default risks than normal. Interestingly, 1928 also appears to have been a year
of high risk tolerance for banks, perhaps indicating that banks were unusually
optimistic about their future prospects.
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TABLE 4 Asset Volatility Regressions
2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant .9885* 1.5098* .6135 .1159
(.3325) (.6696) (.4084) (.3424)
(E/A) .2142* .1822* .3611 * .2030*
(.0171) (.0686) (.0421) (.0614)
(E/A)2 .00128 .00024 .00064
(.00120) (.00067) (.00056)
(TC)# (E/A) .0272 .0536* .0292
(.0278) (.0202) (.0160)
(NB)# (E/A) .0413 .0347 .0103
(.0287) (.0208) (.0164)
(1/MVA)# (E/A) 620,725* 214,457
(221,747) (180,959)
(PAR)# (E/A)20–28 .2884 .3434
(.4917) (.3987)
(SHR)# (E/A)20–28 27.339 28.081
(45.685) (36.615)
(PAR)# (E/A)29–33 2.1838* .6489*
(.2954) (.2582)
(SHR)# (E/A)29–33 11.637* 15.620*
(5.191) (4.118)
(PAR)# (E/A)34–39 .0643 .1265
(.6624) (.5724)
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TABLE 4 (Continued )
2SLS 2SLS OLS OLS







Adjusted R2 .2127 .2153 .6807 .8054
Note.—Dependent variable: bank asset volatility (standard deviation of asset returns, sA). Standard errors
are in parentheses. Asset volatility is defined as the standard deviation of asset returns, sA, where returns equals
the log difference of market asset value; E/A is the ratio of the market value of equity to the market value of
assets; NB and TC are bank charter indicator variables for national banks and state-chartered trust companies,
respectively; PAR is the ratio of the par value of bank stock (stockholder capital subject to double liability)
relative to the market value of assets; SHR (the ratio of the number of shares relative to the market value of
assets) is a measure of stockholder concentration; I/MVA is the inverse of the market value of assets; INDPRO1
is the lag of the log difference of the Federal Reserve industrial production index; D20 . . . D39 are year
indicator variables; and 1940 is the omitted year dummy. In both two-stage-least squares (2SLS) regressions,
E/A is treated as an endogenous variable, and the list of instruments includes lagged values of the following
variables: (E/A), sA, and INDPRO (industrial production).
* Coefficients are significant at below the 5% significance level.
The ratio of the par value of bank stock relative to the market value of
bank capital enters positively and significantly in table 4, specifications 3 and
4, for the subperiod 1929–33, and is insignificantly different from zero in the
other two subperiods. That finding suggests that the extended liability feature
of bank capital permitted banks to expand their asset risk per unit of capital
during the period 1929–33, when the implicit put option of extended liability
was “in the money.”
Ownership concentration enters positively and significantly only in the
period 1934–40, suggesting that the diversification effect outweighs the poor
stockholder effect in that subperiod. That is not surprising, since with the
ending of double liability in 1933, the poor stockholder effect should also
have disappeared.
Bank size is positively related to bank risk choice (negatively related to
the inverse of bank size), although its significance is not robust to the inclusion
of year effects. Size effects were similar to those reported here, or weaker
when we measured size using book values of assets, or when we included
asset size rather than its inverse in the regressions.
Deposit Risk, Deposit Outflows, and the Fisher and Bernanke View
Table 4 shows that a key feature of bank behavior during the Depression was
the willingness to allow deposit default risk to rise temporarily above its long-
run target, rather than suffer the costs from either rapidly liquidating loans
or issuing capital (actions necessary to maintain deposit risk at its low long-
run level). In the regressions in table 5, we examine the relationship between
individual bank deposit outflows and deposit default premiums for New York
City banks. We report OLS results, as well as 2SLS results (using charter
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TABLE 5 Deposit Growth Regressons
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 9.528* 10.234* 12.526* 14.192* 12.215*
(1.038) (1.093) (2.415) (2.547) (4.997)
P .0497* .1166* .0514* .1293* .032*
(.0136) (.0289) (.0137) (.0301) (.013)
Trust Co. 4.476 5.275 3.858
(2.809) (2.906) (2.598)












































Adjusted R2 .021 .026 .021 .028 .169
Note.—OLS p ordinary least squares; 2SLS p two-stage least squares. Dependent variable: annual per-
centage change in deposits. Standard errors are in parentheses; P is the (end-of-year) deposit default premium,
derived from the data over the last 6 months of the year (see data appendix); Trust Co. and Nat. Bank are
indicator variables for state trust companies and national banks; and 1940 is the omitted year dummy. In the
two 2SLS regressions, P is treated as an endogenous variable, and the list of instruments includes lagged
values of the following variables: (E/A) the ratio of the market value of equity to the market value of assets,
sA (standard deviation of asset returns), and INDPRO (industrial production).
* Coefficients are significant at below the 5% significance level.
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type indicators; lagged industrial production growth; and lags of the default
premium, equity volatility, capital ratio, and the contemporaneous percentage
bid-ask spread on bank stock as instruments).
We find a large and statistically significant positive relationship between
deposit default risk (P) and deposit outflows. The inclusion of year effects
reduces the size of that effect slightly, but the coefficient on deposit risk
remains significant. Instrumenting strengthens the effect of P on deposit
growth. One interpretation of the larger negative coefficients for the 2SLS
results is that deposit contractions promote (or are associated with) endogenous
behavior by banks that reduce deposit risk.
These results provide evidence that depositors were able, in some degree,
to identify weak banks and penalize them for undesirable increases in default
risk. These results do not necessarily imply that depositors “knew” the Black
and Scholes (1973) model; more likely, depositors were able to observe the
decline in bank stock values easily and make roughly accurate appraisals of
the changing risk of deposits by observing changes in market prices (and
associated changes in bank leverage). Similar evidence that depositors were
able to discriminate across banks during the Depression in their withdrawals
is provided in Calomiris and Mason (1997) for Chicago banks. They use
interest costs of debt (rather than implied default premiums) to measure cross-
sectional differences in bank default risk. Calomiris and Mason (2003) also
find evidence (for Fed member banks nationwide) that forecasts of bank default
risk based on interest rate costs and other variables predicted which banks
suffered closure or deposit contraction the most during the Depression.
The evidence thus far indicates that our theoretical framework fits the facts
of bank behavior during the 1920s and 1930s well. During the 1920s, increases
in bank lending opportunities prompted banks to accumulate capital and in-
crease asset risk. Asset risk and capital were maintained such that deposit risk
remained small. In response to the adverse shocks to bank capital experienced
during the 1930s, banks allowed capital to remain low and reduced asset risk
by substituting into riskless assets and limiting the riskiness of their loan
portfolios.
What do our results have to say about the question of whether the decline
in bank lending was induced by weak loan demand (falling quasi rents from
lending) as opposed to the high costs of supplying loans (the Fisher [1933]
and Bernanke [1983] view, which requires both a high lemons premium on
new equity and the constraint requiring low risk on deposits)? The fact that
increasing the risk of bank deposits was costly for banks—in the form of
deposit withdrawals—suggests that the cost of supplying loans was a binding
constraint for many banks. Obviously, banks experiencing large deposit out-
flows faced a strong supply-side incentive to cut lending. Thus, the evidence
that default risk on deposits rose and that rises in default risk gave banks a
strong incentive to cut lending (to preserve deposits) provides support for the
Fisher and Bernanke view that the bank capital crunch contracted the supply
of lending and thus likely worsened the severity of the Depression.
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1920 5 0 6
1921 5 0 6
1922 5 1 5
1923 2 0 3
1924 7 3 1
1925 10 2 2
1926 6 1 7
1927 15 5 4
1928 16 4 5
1929 22 7 8
1930 2 1 10
1931 1 0 9
1932 0 0 0
1933 0 0 0
1934 1 0 0
1935 0 0 0
1936 0 0 0
1937 2 0 0
1938 0 0 0
1939 0 0 0
1940 0 0 0
Source.—Moody’s Manual of Investments: Banks, Insurance Companies, Investment Trusts, Real Estate
Finance and Credit Companies (New York: Moody’s Investors Service, various years).
Note.—The sample of banks is restricted to those included in our database, as defined in the data appendix.
Dividend Payments, Bid-Ask Spreads, and the Cost of Bank Capital
Another approach to testing the Fisher (1933) and Bernanke (1983) view is
to investigate how deposit risk and adverse-selection costs affected bank cap-
ital accumulation decisions. Were deposit risk and adverse-selection costs
binding constraints on dividend payments and bank stock issues? If banks
could have raised stock easily in the 1930s, they could thereby have reduced
leverage and the risk of default on their deposits. Doing so would have avoided
the binding constraint of depositor discipline and the need to curtail the supply
of bank loans and payments of dividends.
Our model predicts that banks with higher adverse-selection costs will
choose lower capital and lower asset risk (point X rather than point Z in fig.
2). Here we examine the links between adverse-selection costs and decisions
to raise capital and pay dividends.
Table 6 presents data on the timing of stock issues for our sample of banks.
Table 7 reports logit results predicting the decision to issue stock. We define
the event of a stock issue in two ways: narrowly (issuing stock unrelated to
an acquisition of another bank) and broadly (including stock swaps associated
with bank acquisitions). We include the lagged bid-ask spread and year in-
dicators in our logit regressions for the period 1921–30. The paucity of stock
issues after 1930 makes it impossible to extend our logit sample period beyond
1930.
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 2.71* 3.73* 2.71* 2.89*
(.24) (.75) (.20) (.45)
ba1 .180* .178* .089* .095*
(.070) (.070) (.048) (.048)
Year 1922 .79 .11
(.85) (.59)
Year 1923 .55 .31
(.87) (.62)
Year 1924 .04 1.14
(1.01) (.82)
Year 1925 .87 .21
(.85) (.62)
Year 1926 .83 .08
(.85) (.59)
Year 1927 .68 .22
(.87) (.62)
Year 1928 1.03 .22
(.83) (.55)
Year 1929 1.49 .61
(.79) (.52)
Year 1930 2.21* 1.47*
(.76) (.48)
Note.—ba1 is the percent bid-ask spread at the end of the previous year; 1921 is the omitted year dummy.
* Coefficients are significant at below the 5% significance level.
We find that the lagged bid-ask spread is useful as a predictor of stock
issues, even after controlling for time effects. Banks with lower bid-ask spreads
were more likely to issue stock than other banks (irrespective of whether the
issuing event is defined narrowly or broadly).
While these results do not provide direct evidence on the 1930s, they do
show that the bid-ask spread is a useful measure of the adverse-selection costs
of issuing equity. The link between bid-ask spreads and issuing costs during
the 1920s lends plausibility to the view that the increase in adverse-selection
costs during the 1930s—apparent in the doubling of bid-ask spreads—can
explain the absence of stock offerings during that period. Stated differently,
from the perspective of the panel findings of table 7, and of the growth in
bid-ask spreads shown in tables 2 and 3, it is plausible to argue that banks
faced much higher costs of issuing equity in the 1930s than in the 1920s and
that this can explain the absence of equity offerings (table 6).
In results not reported here, we checked the robustness of table 7’s results
to alternative explanations for the predictive power of the bid-ask spread. For
example, we included the bank share price as a regressor to control for the
potential influence of minimum price ticks on the percentage bid-ask spread.
While this is generally an important determinant of percentage bid-ask spreads
in current markets, there was no share price effect on percentage bid-ask
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spreads in our sample, partly owing to the fact that the price per share tended
to be high during our period.
The bid-ask spread is not only negatively associated with the decision of
whether to issue stock, it is also negatively associated with the capital ratio
chosen by the bank (E/A), as predicted by our model. Table 8 reports reduced-
form regression results for the bank capital ratio. Consistent with our view
that bid-ask spreads capture adverse-selection costs that discourage a high-
risk–high-equity strategy, we find that the bid-ask spread is negatively as-
sociated with the capital ratio chosen by the bank.
While the percentage bid-ask spread is negatively associated with the pro-
pensity to raise capital by offering shares on the market (and the average
capital ratio of banks during our period), our proxy for adverse-selection costs
is positively associated with the tendency to accumulate capital internally
during the 1930s—which was accomplished by cutting dividends. Information
and agency costs encourage the payment of dividends, and cutting dividends
is costly (Miller and Rock 1985; Ofer and Siegel 1987). Indeed, the fact that
New York banks were paying dividends while simultaneously raising signif-
icant amounts of equity during the 1920s provides prima facie evidence that
paying dividends was valuable to our sample firms.
Table 9 reports dividend data retrospectively for 1929 and 1939, for the
banks included in our 1939 sample. Dividend reduction was often large during
the 1930s, and there is substantial cross-sectional variation in the extent to
which banks cut dividends.
In table 10, we report panel OLS results for the annual percentage growth
of nominal dividends for banks over the period 1929–39 (the period that saw
significant reductions in bank dividends). We include the percentage bid-ask
spread and the default risk on deposits as regressors. Both are significant
negative predictors of dividend growth. Banks experiencing high deposit de-
fault risk or a high bid-ask spread were likely to cut dividends more than
other banks. During the adjustment process of the 1930s, the more a bank
needed to reduce its deposit risk (the higher was P), and the harder it would
be for the bank to float equity to reduce deposit risk in the future if it had to
(the higher was the bid-ask spread, ba), the more the bank reduced current
dividends. Cutting dividends, in other words, was both a way to restore low
default risk and to self-insure against the possibility of having to raise (ex-
pensive) equity in the future, and the value of that self-insurance was highest
for banks that faced the highest costs of accessing equity in the market.
V. Implications for Arguments about Depression-Era Changes in
Bank Risk Preferences
One of the lessons of our study is that when examining bank portfolio or
financing changes during the Depression, it is important to look at both sides
of the balance sheet at the same time. Previous analysis of the behavior of
banks can be criticized for not having done so. For example, Berger et al.
Bank Capital and Portfolio Management 449
TABLE 8 Reduced-Form Regressions for Bank Capital Ratio
1920–40 1920–40 1920–28 1920–28 1929–40 1929–40
Variable (1) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4)
Constant .178* .076* .254* .039* .087* .023
(.010) (.018) (.017) (.012) (.020) (.017)
Trust Co. .029* .039* .056* .005 .019 .010
(.010) (.008) (.012) (.007) (.012) (.010)
Nat. Bank .009 .016 .021 .004 .009 .008
(.010) (.009) (.012) (.007) (.014) (.011)
ba .005* .0023* .0030 .0002 .0023* .0023*
(.001) (.0009) (.0019) (.0018) (.0010) (.0009)
E/A1 .0095 .0062*
(.0003) (.0004)
Year 1920 .049* .136* .043*
(.022) (.020) (.011)
Year 1921 .063* .123* .023*
(.022) (.020) (.011)
Year 1922 .058* .128* .035*
(.020) (.018) (.011)
Year 1923 .060* .125* .029*
(.020) (.018) (.010)
Year 1924 .073* .112* .027*
(.020) (.018) (.010)
Year 1925 .098* .085* .009
(.019) (.017) (.010)
Year 1926 .102* .082* .026*
(.020) (.017) (.009)




Year 1929 .180* .181* .066*
(.020) (.020) (.019)
Year 1930 .122* .123* .022
(.019) (.019) (.018)
Year 1931 .069* .070* .001
(.021) (.021) (.018)
Year 1932 .081* .083* .055*
(.023) (.023) (.019)
Year 1933 .036* .038 .007
(.023) (.022) (.019)
Year 1934 .028 .030 .022
(.023) (.023) (.019)
Year 1935 .051* .053* .051*
(.023) (.023) (.019)
Year 1936 .046* .048* .029
(.023) (.023) (.019)
Year 1937 .017 .019 .002
(.023) (.023) (.019)
Year 1938 .012 .014 .018
(.023) (.023) (.019)
Year 1939 .024 .025 .031
(.023) (.022) (.018)
Adjusted R2 .052 .318 .266 .851 .332 .595
Note.—The dependent variable is market capital-to-asset ratio (E/A). Standard errors are in parentheses;
ba is the contemporaneous percent bid-ask spread for bank stock; Trust Co. and Nat. Bank are indicator
variables for state trust companies and national banks; 1940 is the omitted year dummy in cols. 2, 4, and 4;
and 1928 is the omitted year dummy in cols. 3 and 3.
* Coefficients are significant at below the 5% significance level.
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Bankers Trust Company 30.0 2.0
Bank of New York & Trust 20.0 14.0
Brooklyn Trust Company 30.0 4.0
Central Trust Company 3.0 4.0
Chase National Bank 10.5 1.4
Chemical National Bank 12.0 1.8
National City Bank 7.0 4.0
Commercial National Bank & Trust .0 8.0
Continental Bank & Trust 8.8 .8
Corn Exchange Bank & Trust 12.0 3.0
Empire Trust Company 16.0 .6
Fifth Avenue Bank 59.0 24.0
First National Bank 20.0 15.0
Guaranty Trust Company 14.0 7.0
Irving Trust Company 7.0 3.6
Bank of the Manhattan Company 16.0 .9
Manufacturers Trust Company 5.8 2.0
New York Trust Company 20.0 4.0
Public Bank of New York 4.0 1.5
Title Guarantee & Trust Company 36.0 .0
United States Trust Company 60.0 60.0
Source.—Moody’s Manual of Investments: Banks, Insurance Companies, Investment Trusts, Real Estate
Finance and Credit Companies (New York: Moody’s Investors Service, various years).
Note.—The sample of banks included in this table is restricted to banks in our database (as defined in the
data appendix) that were in existence both in 1929 and in 1939.
(1995, p. 403) conclude that the precipitous decline in bank (book) capital-
to-asset ratios after 1933 reflected the effects of government deposit insurance,
which relieved banks from having to satisfy depositor discipline.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), examining the asset side of the banks’
balance sheets, arrive at the opposite conclusion. They argue that banks felt
obliged to increase their holdings of cash and Treasury securities because of
the increased risk faced by banks. Friedman and Schwartz argue that the
failure of the Fed to act as a lender of last resort made banks realize that they
were more vulnerable than they had previously thought.
An implication of the Friedman and Schwartz (1963) view is that bankers
and depositors would have targeted lower default risk for any given lending
risk than they did prior to the Depression. Berger et al.’s (1995) view implies
the opposite—that is, greater tolerance for bank default risk after 1933 than
during the 1920s.
Our data do not support either implication. The targeted default risk of
deposits in the late 1930s—like that of the 1920s—was very low. Depositors’
tolerance for default risk neither rose (as argued by Berger et al. [1995]) nor
fell (as implied by our interpretation of the Friedman-Schwartz [1963] view).
Once one considers bank capital ratios and asset risk together, New York City
banks behaved as if they were responding to the same depositor preferences
in the 1920s and the 1930s. Lower capital ratios in the 1930s did not reflect
an absence of discipline, and neither did lower asset risk reflect an increase
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TABLE 10 Dividend Growth Regressions (1929–39)
Variable (1) (2) (3 )
Constant 3.77 6.75 7.85
(4.13) (8.91) (9.21)
ba 1.91* 1.78* 1.81*
(.65) (.67) (.75)






Year 1929 11.31 11.42
(11.01) (11.15)
Year 1930 22.31* 22.38*
(10.75) (11.00)
Year 1931 1.16 1.35
(11.12) (11.27)
Year 1932 9.70 9.74
(11.76) (11.90)
Year 1933 11.12 11.16
(11.75) (11.87)
Year 1934 2.12 2.55
(11.81) (12.00)
Year 1935 2.86 3.09
(11.81) (11.91)
Year 1936 .74 .65
(11.69) (11.81)
Year 1937 1.89 2.27
(11.66) (11.83)
Year 1938 .36 .26
(11.66) (11.76)
Adjusted R2 .05 .06 .05
Note.—The dependent variable is annual percentage change in dividends. Standard errors are in parentheses;
ba and P are the end-of-year percent bid-ask spread and deposit default premium; and 1939 is the omitted
year dummy.
* Coefficients are significant at below the 5% significance level.
in risk aversion. Rather, the level of discipline was unchanged, but banks
chose to substitute lower asset risk for lost capital because the cost of issuing
new capital had risen. We also note that the fact that New York City banks
reduced their capital during the Depression is prima facie evidence against
the view that deposit insurance caused that decline more generally, since New
York City banks enjoyed very little benefit from federal deposit insurance
owing to the large deposits held in those banks (Saunders and Wilson 1995).
VI. Conclusion
Recent theoretical work in banking and corporate finance under asymmetric
information emphasizes that depositors may be intolerant of default risk on
their deposits and may reward banks for keeping default risk low. Information
problems also make it more costly for banks to issue stock. Other related
work on banking sees bankers as information producers and managers who
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earn quasi rents through risky lending, based on possessing scarce information.
Our theoretical framework combines these insights (along with standard con-
tingent claims pricing) to solve for the equilibrium asset risk choices, and
financing choices, of banks.
We apply this framework to New York City banks during the period
1920–40. Our findings support the key theoretical propositions developed in
Sections II and III. Capital ratios and asset risk are alternative means that
banks use to limit deposit default risk. Normally, banks strive to keep default
risk low to avoid withdrawals by risk-intolerant depositors. In response to the
capital losses of the Depression, banks substituted into low-risk assets as
quickly as possible and cut dividends. Still, they were forced to let their default
risk rise temporarily. Over time, as loan liquidation proceeded, default risk
returned to its low long-run equilibrium levels.
Deposit outflows were the inevitable cost of choosing not to liquidate loans
faster or issue new capital. Banks that suffered larger increases in default risk
during the Depression suffered greater percentage shrinkage in their deposit
base and made larger cuts to dividends. The reason that banks did not issue
new capital in the 1930s was the higher adverse-selection costs (reflected in
wider bid-ask spreads) associated with bank stock in the wake of the
Depression.
Our findings indicate no long-run change in the tolerance for deposit risk
following the Great Depression. We find that banks in the mid-1930s achieved
the same level of default risk on deposits via a different combination of capital
and asset risk.
Our findings have general implications for the literature on “capital
crunches,” and for the Fisher (1933) and Bernanke (1983) interpretation of
bank credit reduction during the Depression. We have argued that New York
City banks faced binding financing constraints that reduced the supply of bank
loans. Loans did not decline solely because of the reduced opportunities for
profitable lending. Banks scrambled to shed asset risk during this period, to
restore their default risk to the low long-run desired level, and to avoid the
high cost of issuing capital as an alternative means to reduce default risk.
Avoiding the prohibitive cost of issuing capital entailed a costly adjustment
process—banks balanced the costs of forgone lending opportunities, disruptive
deposit withdrawals, and stockholder displeasure at draconian reductions in
dividends.
Despite the support we provide for the Fisher (1933) and Bernanke (1983)
view, our analysis also contains a cautionary note. While we have shown that
bank lending was constrained in the early 1930s by the capital losses of the
Great Depression, we have not shown how much higher bank lending would
have been in the absence of those constraints. Our model of bank risk and
financing choices (depicted in fig. 2) illustrates why it is difficult to determine
the precise extent to which a collapse of lending is caused by lost bank capital.
A movement from X to Z in figure 2 reflects some combination of a higher
cost of capital and reduced lending opportunities (lower bank quasi rents from
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lending). While we have argued that financing constraints were important
binding constraints during the 1930s, we cannot address empirically the coun-
terfactual question of how much lending would have declined simply due to
the decline in lending opportunities because we lack a good measure of the
quasi rents from bank lending.
Finally, our evidence—that (1) markets and depositors discriminate across
banks when measuring risk, (2) depositors apply market discipline selectively
to reward prudence, and (3) the threat of discipline leads banks to reduce
asset risk following capital losses—suggests potential gains from reintroducing
market discipline into banking. Government safety nets can eliminate the
incentive to reduce asset risk in the wake of losses. Indeed, protected banks
may increase risk after capital losses (to maximize the value of the safety net
subsidy). Requiring banks to meet market standards for prudence could mit-
igate such moral hazard problems and reduce the vulnerability of banking
systems to collapse (see also Calomiris 1997; and Shadow Financial Regu-
latory Committee 2000).
Data Appendix
The data sample comprises an annual bank balance sheet, dividend, and stock issuance
data and weekly stock price data for a sample of New York City banks whose bid
and ask quotes were reported in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle and whose
stock was actively traded over the period 1920–39. In 1920 (1939), this sample included
approximately 55 (32) banks, with the largest decline in sample bank numbers during
the early 1930s. The sample consists of national banks, state banks, and trust com-
panies, ranging in size from large-money-center banks to smaller borough and suburban
banks.
Annual bank-specific balance sheet data, including capital, surplus, deposits, cash,
securities, loans, and total assets, were collected from Rand McNally Bankers Direc-
tory. The balance sheet data were also cross-checked for accuracy with Moody’s
Manual of Investments, which began publication in 1928. This latter resource also
allowed us to collect detailed historical accounts of bank capital levels, new capital
issues, dividends, and stock dividends and splits.
Bid-ask spreads, market values of capital, and equity returns volatility were cal-
culated from stock prices reported weekly in the Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
Specifically, the average of reported bid and ask quotes was used to develop a weekly
stock series for each bank, which was then adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends.
The standard deviation of equity returns was then calculated, based on the 6 months
of weekly stock prices preceding the report date, for the bank’s (year-end) balance
sheet data. The Black and Scholes (1973) model, and a double-liability variant of that
model used for the period through 1933, were used to derive implied asset volatility
sA (the standard deviation of asset returns) and deposit default premiums from our
measures of market capital values, book values of debt, and equity returns volatility.
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